The ceasefire is not in the interest of Ukraine.

Remember, the Ukrainians didn't want a ceasefire.

The Europeans didn't want a ceasefire.

They now do.

The Ukrainians now do.

Well, they want a ceasefire because they know that Donald Trump wants a ceasefire.

[MUSIC] Hello and welcome to GZERO World.

I'm Ian Bremmer and I'm coming to you from Munich, Germany, the site of the 62nd Annual Munich Security Conference, where our European brothers and sisters are nothing short of freaked out.

Take the conference's theme this year, "Under Destruction," a nod to political forces that favor demolition over reform, where the most powerful countries wield, and I quote, "bulldozers, wrecking balls and chainsaws."

And in case you haven't figured it out already, the wrecking ball isn't coming from Moscow or Beijing, it's coming from Washington, D.C.

Here's Germany's chancellor kicking off the conference.

The United States' claim to leadership has been challenged and possibly lost.

Challenged and lost, Merz is saying, by the United States itself.

President Trump's second term has cemented a unilateral, transactional American foreign policy.

Allies are being forced to accept that the United States no longer sees itself as the guarantor of the global order it built, but instead is the principal disruptor of it.

This didn't all start with President Trump.

Across the G7, only a small proportion of citizens believe that their government's policies will make future generations better off.

Trust in political institutions has been eroding for decades.

And speaking of wrecking balls, last year's conference saw a newly elected Vice President Vance give a blistering speech informing the Europeans that there was a "new sheriff" in town and criticizing them for censoring far-right voices and failing to control migration.

The threat that I worry the most about vis-a-vis Europe is not Russia, it's not China, it's not any other external actor.

And what I worry about is the threat from within.

This year, Secretary of State Marco Rubio is representing the Trump administration and he is striking a more, shall we say, diplomatic tone.

We are connected spiritually and we are connected culturally.

We want Europe to be strong.

We believe that Europe must survive.

But even still, there is a larger question hanging over this conference.

As the United States under Trump is more focused on dominating the free world rather than leading it, who becomes its defender?

The Europeans?

The Canadians?

The Gulf Nations?

The Japanese?

I'm not hearing any convincing answers to that question.

And if the world's democracies can't answer that question, will the Chinese and the rest of the, shall we say, less free world, be happy to do so?

I'm digging into all that and more with Ivo Daalder, former U.S.

ambassador to NATO and senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center.

Don't worry, I've also got your puppet regime.

Hello, Vladimir.

Oh, hi.

You good?

You good?

Uh, yeah, chilling.

Anyway, sucker, you saw I got your friend India to stop buying your oil.

But first, a word from the folks who help us keep the lights on.

Funding for GZERO World is provided by our lead sponsor, Prologis.

Every day, all over the world, Prologis helps businesses of all sizes lower their carbon footprint and scale their supply chains.

With a portfolio of logistics and real estate and an end-to-end solutions platform addressing the critical initiatives of global logistics today.

Learn more at Prologis.com.

And by Cox Enterprises is proud to support GZERO.

Cox is investing in the future, working to create an impact in advanced recycling and in emerging technology companies that will help shape tomorrow.

Cox, a family of businesses.

Additional funding provided by Carnegie Corporation of New York, Koo and Patricia Yuen, committed to bridging cultural differences in our communities, and... Ivo Daalder, welcome back to the show.

It's great to be back.

So towards the close of the Munich Security Conference here and so much talk about whether or not the transatlantic relationship and NATO are going to persist in the form that they have in past decades.

Your answer to that?

No, it's not going to be the same as it's been in the past decade.

That's gone.

But the transatlantic relationship in some form will continue.

Not because Marco Rubio, the Secretary of State, said that it was, and that our future was intertwined with that of Europe, something I strongly believe, but I don't believe his president believes.

But because there is going to be a new kind of NATO, a rebalancing between European and American responsibilities for defense and security in Europe.

Timely, a good way.

I would have liked to have seen it much more smoothly done than the way it was done, but perhaps the outcome is not going to be the worst thing at all.

What struck me is that a year ago when we were sitting here, this was all about America.

And now this meeting was all about Europe.

What is Europe going to do?

And what are the Europeans prepared to do?

And it really wasn't any more about, "Are the Americans with us?"

It was sort of like, "Yeah, maybe, but we're going to do our thing anyway."

And I think that's an interesting development.

And in some ways, it's a development that when you say you'd like it to be more smooth, I mean, you could take away, you wish that the Trump administration handled it more diplomatically, more collegially, but you could also say you wish that the Europeans had started doing this in a serious way decades ago.

Absolutely.

I mean, clearly, this rebalancing that is necessary is something that should have happened a long time ago.

Europe, 80 years after World War II, part of an organization that was set up to give Europe the confidence to rebuild and regenerate, which they did, brilliantly, through the European Union in a whole variety of ways.

But really, since the end of the Cold War, kind of assumed that we were living in a world in which defense was no longer possible.

And we lost 25 years, with some exceptions, but really not with the big ones.

Europe unilaterally disarmed.

It basically said we don't need defense.

And the defense it did, importantly, was defense it did in favor of the United States.

Troops to Afghanistan, capabilities to Afghanistan, the one and a half percent or so was spent on operations in Afghanistan.

That's not a single one of these allies, many of who lost significant numbers of soldiers, did so because it was in their security.

They thought it was important to show the United States that they were good allies.

So, yes, they should have started a long time ago.

They're now starting.

And now the question is, can the machinery in NATO, which is a US-dominated machinery, in fact, we in the US created the NATO that put us at the center, will that machinery be able to evolve smoothly enough to accommodate a greater and greater and greater role for Europe?

Now, when you say Europe, you could be forgiven for believing that the Europeans were actually doing something on defense, and yet it's the Germans that are doing something.

It's the Poles, it's the Balts, it's not the Spaniards, it's not so much the Italians.

That's a big question too.

It is a big question.

So it's all the Nordics, it's the, and the Balts, and the Poles and the Germans, it's the Dutch, it's the Dutch.

The French and the French and the Brits are not going to increase defense spending, they have for a whole variety of reasons that that's not going to happen anytime soon, but they didn't disarm, right?

They continue to spend 2% of GDP, a good part of it on the procurement side for nuclear weapons, particularly in the British case, but they still have, you know, they're not as big, they're not as ready, they're not as good as they used to be, but very different than the Germans who basically had no capability at all.

So you're really talking about the southern Europeans.

It's one way to look at it is the beer drinkers seem to be taking defense seriously, and the wine drinkers with the French kind of unique in there, maybe a little less worried about security and a little less willing to rejigger their budget.

What about, I mean, NATO, there is no existential threat to NATO today.

There's not an existential threat, but the Russian threat is real.

And it's real on the one hand, you're looking at Ukraine and say, listen, four years in, they've lost 1.2, 1.3 million men, both severely wounded and dead.

- 30,000, 35,000 a month casualties the Russians have taken in December and January.

Those are, under any circumstances, just astonishing numbers.

They are astonishing.

And the losses, so 1.2 million, 1.3 million now, people off the battlefield.

- Battle losses.

- A lot of them dead, a lot of them severely wounded.

The replacement rate is now below the casualty rate.

The number of people they're able to recruit with extraordinary amounts of money, sometimes 50, 60, $70,000 to sign up, they're not particularly good at what they're doing.

They're fodder, literally fodder.

It's extraordinary, but, and there is a but, the entire Russian economy is now a war economy.

It's churning out more equipment, missiles, drones, not so much sophisticated tanks and that kind of things, at a rate that is faster than they've ever done before.

Whole parts of the armed forces, much of the Navy, much of the Air Force has not been involved in this war.

So, in the end, you will have a battle-hardened Russian army, you will have a war economy that really needs to continue to produce stuff, and you will have a, you know, most likely a need by the leadership to demonstrate that whatever they got out of Ukraine was worth it, maybe by taking some other steps.

So, I do think the Russians are a serious threat.

On the other hand, economically, militarily, and other than nuclear weapons, they're no match to what the Europeans could have and what NATO can have.

Now, the Americans are, with the exception of some intelligence support, and of course they're selling lots of weapons to the Europeans, but they're really not, they're kind of out of the game in terms of providing support to the Ukrainians at this point.

Totally.

They're completely out of the game, and I was a little nonplussed by the fact that the Secretary General kept on saying the Americans are providing all those weapons.

- Mark Rutte, yeah.

They're selling all those weapons.

- But they're giving, yeah, they're selling.

They're making money as... - Capitalists do.

- As capitalists do, certainly as Donald Trump does.

It keeps on saying, "The great news is we're helping Ukraine and we're getting paid for it."

Well, actually, that's not really helping Ukraine.

That is making sure that the Europeans are paying for stuff that the United States should be giving.

They are providing very important intelligence information that is crucial both to defend Ukraine against the missile attacks that are continuing, the drone attacks that are continuing to bombard cities throughout Ukraine, and for some of the battlefield logistics and ways, that's important.

And frankly, the Europeans can't yet give, although they're trying to figure out ways to do that.

So it's really the Europeans who are carrying the burden.

And part of the reality is we're running out of stuff to-- the US is running out of stuff to sell.

I hear that there are Patriot batteries right now that actually don't have missiles, so the Ukrainians aren't able to knock these Russian missiles out of the sky.

Yeah, and so it's not a question of you need to give us more Patriots, because there aren't any more.

There are 600 Pac-3 Patriots produced a year.

Most of the European inventories are below where they should be for their own defense.

Some of them are like the Danes have given everything.

The Dutch are getting very close to having given everything.

The Norwegians are now discussing whether they might give everything on their NASAMS, which can't shoot down ballistic missiles, but can be pretty good against cruise missiles and other things.

So yeah, the fight is hard because Ukrainians are running out of stuff and the support is there, the willingness is there, the money is there, but the capability is there, which is kind of when you think about it, four years into this war, we haven't figured out how to increase production of basic capabilities that everybody knows we will need in any future war, really raises questions about the US, Europe, defense preparedness, and have we actually taken the world as it is seriously?

And, you know, you'd think if anyone would get that right, it would be the companies who have a fiduciary responsibility to maximize their ability to make revenue.

Why do you think they haven't?

Well, because we have defense budgets that need to improve year after year, and they say I'm not going to spend any more money on production capabilities until I get paid.

And so, you know, they could actually expand their production capabilities, but they're going to be paid year by year, and they don't know whether the money will be the next year or whether there will be a government shutdown, they won't get any money.

So they're not willing to take risks.

Now, I would argue that they should.

They look at the world geopolitically in the way that you and I do.

We see a much more dangerous world.

You say, I say this is the most dangerous period in our lifetime.

The likelihood of a great power war is probably higher now than any time since 1945.

So the reality is we're going to need a lot of stuff.

And why they're not doing it, that's a good question for them to answer.

So, one of the things I've heard on the sidelines of Munich this year, which surprised me a little bit, was that if there were a ceasefire, given the Trump administration and the lack, the desire to open up with the Russians immediately on the back of that, that many frontline states would be much more vulnerable to a false flag attack from the Russians.

That a ceasefire might not be in the interests of the Baltic States, of others.

I've actually heard that from several leaders.

I was surprised by that.

Yeah, yeah.

Well, you know, a ceasefire is not in the interest of Ukraine.

Remember, the Ukrainians didn't want a ceasefire.

The Europeans didn't want a ceasefire.

- They now do.

The Ukrainians now do.

- Well, they want a ceasefire because they know that Donald Trump wants a ceasefire.

I mean, much of the negotiations that have been going on is a negotiation between the Ukrainians and the United States, not between the Ukrainians and Russia.

And the U.S.

is trying to get Ukraine to accept something that the Russians are willing to accept, and they're pushing Ukraine.

It started with the ceasefire.

I mean, the ceasefire was... - And Trump literally just said that.

He said, "The Ukrainians better step up because the Russians are ready for peace."

He said that yesterday.

- Yeah, exactly.

And you... But this has been the entire pattern.

I mean, when the blowup happened a year ago in the Oval Office... You're not in a good position.

You don't have the cards right now.

With us, you start having cards.

Right now, you're playing cards.

You're playing cards.

You're gambling with the lives of millions of people.

You're gambling with World War III.

And the Europeans then came to Zelensky and said, "You know, the one thing you can give, you know, except a ceasefire... A ceasefire is not a good thing.

A frozen conflict, maybe.

If a cease-fire leads to the deployment of the security guarantee, if the Europeans start putting forces in there, and the Americans are willing to provide a backstop, then I think it's okay.

But if a ceasefire means that the United States is opening up economic and all the kinds of relationships with the Russians, weaken sanctions, start pushing the Europeans to release the Russian frozen assets and give them back to Russia, all of which the indication is where the Trump administration would like to go.

And many Europeans would follow the United States in that case.

Not all.

Not all.

Not all.

The ability to maintain, let alone get new sanctions, is going to be much, much more difficult.

And so, yes, the deterrent effect starts to unravel.

And frankly, it unravels only because of one reason, because Donald Trump wants to be seen as the man who brought the peace to this war.

Or at least the brought ceasefire.

Yeah, exactly.

And the war.

And this is a trap.

And I think it's interesting that people are now starting to react to that, that that's what you're hearing, because it is a trap, potentially, doesn't have to be, ending a real ceasefire that creates a frozen conflict in which the Europeans are willing to back up the Ukrainians to the to the hilt, where Ukraine moves forward rapidly on EU membership, I would argue rapidly on NATO membership, but that's not going to happen.

That's fine.

Right now, I think that's what the Ukrainians are happy with.

They're much more worried about a ceasefire that isn't real, isn't followed up, that leads to the unraveling of everything that's there.

Because that's neither a just nor a sustainable peace.

Two words, by the way, that Marco Rubio used today.

These are European stock phrases, "just sustainable peace."

Marco Rubio used them.

Good for him.

He did.

He did.

And Marco Rubio got a standing ovation from the European crowd, from a European crowd that was stunned by JD Vance a year ago.

You and I saw it, that basically called out the Europeans as the problem.

Now, his speech was certainly much friendlier, much more cordial, much more engaging.

So in a time of headlines heralding the end of the transatlantic era, let it be known and clear to all that this is neither our goal nor our wish.

Because for us Americans, our home may be in the Western Hemisphere, but we will always be a child of Europe.

But the policies of the United States have not changed one iota towards Europe in the last year.

So were you surprised by that reaction?

Well, I think Wolfgang Ischinger, chairman of the MSC, put it exactly right.

I think they rose because of the relief that it wasn't another tongue lashing that they got a year ago.

Oh my God, not another tongue lashing.

But I mean, does that... But on the other hand, I think if it, on reflection, part of the speech was incoherent, and part of the reason it was incoherent was trying to speak to the audience in a reassuring manner, while at the same time speaking to that other audience, which is the audience of one back in the White House, to make sure that he maintains the big line.

And the other one is this deep, uncomfortable argument that the entire administration is making on civilizational erasure, the fact that if you have immigrants coming to your country that don't look like you, all of a sudden you become different.

That is just not how Europe thinks.

By the way, it's not how most Americans think.

It's not how America used to think.

This white Christian nationalism that is now infusing MAGA is being exported by the United States.

It's not a surprise that Rubio's next two stops are Slovakia and Hungary.

Also for his audience back in the United States, not really for the Hungarians and Slovaks.

I don't think the Europeans should take this, "Oh my God, the US has turned a corner.

They're back."

The other weird thing about the civilizational point is that the Europeans were getting harder on their own border security and migration before the Americans.

I mean, Angela Merkel understood that when she was going to take a million Syrian refugees, that her population was not having it.

So there's actually more alignment on that.

- There's much more alignment on this, and there's much more alignment on the security threat.

But MAGA has gone further, right?

I mean, MAGA looks at Russia, some part of MAGA, as an ally because of the church, because Putin is anti-gay and LGBTQ+.

I guess Putin is anti-DEI.

I mean, all those things that MAGA has now incorporated, that's just not how Europeans think.

They still think that climate change is important.

I think Merz made that point.

I mean, the strongest point in his speech was when he said, you know, that our values, there are differences in our values.

JD Vance talked about differences.

Yeah, Merz came on anti-MAGA.

It was the first time I'd seen a major European leader do that.

Well, so what I heard in the corridors from a lot of people, they're shocked by the fact that the State Department is spending money supporting MAGA, allying think tanks.

Think tanks that are extraordinarily pro-Russian.

By the way, think tanks that may not be pro-American, although when the money flows, they'll probably become more pro-American.

And that they're actively undermining the civil structure of our societies.

It's remarkable that that's happening from your longstanding ally across the Atlantic.

There's a deep worry that the ideological attack on Europe from the United States is actually more important than the disagreement they're having over the defense burden.

Yes, the final point here is that, you know, it's an interesting tension that on the one hand, the Americans under Trump do not want to see a united Europe.

They are spending money and engaging politically in ways that would undermine that strength.

And yet they're pushing much harder than Biden or Obama had been for the Europeans to more effectively arm themselves, to become more productive, to actually have more economic growth, which would make them stronger.

So there is this very unusual tension in the policy.

Yeah, that wouldn't be the first time that Donald Trump is pursuing policies that are not mutually inclusive.

I mean, his entire trade policy, which is what drives them to wanting Europe to be broken up, the European Union, so he can pick them off one by one, which is a lot easier than having to pick off one big 450 million market.

He's not succeeding completely, he's succeeding more better than I'd thought and better than I'd hoped.

I think the Europeans have much more power to push back.

But I think the strength argument is to say, you need to do it because we're no longer doing it.

I mean, we're leaving.

And I think Elbridge Colby, who said, you know, we're still we want a stronger NATO and we want but but behind that, Elbridge Colby, the Undersecretary of Defense, who was at the Defense Ministerial and here, rather than Pete Hegseth, he's a, you know, he's a nicer guy, he's intellectually more coherent than his boss.

But the message is the same.

We have interests elsewhere that are more important, both in the Western Hemisphere and in the Pacific than Europe.

And so if you care about security in Europe, you need to take care of that so we can take care of our own things.

That's a very consistent message.

Ivo Daalder, thanks for joining.

Always a pleasure to be here.

And now to Puppet Regime, where it's a story of he said, he said, Xi said, and that's Xi with an X. Roll that tape.

Hello Vladimir.

Oh, hi.

- You good?

You good?

Uh, yeah, chilling.

Anyway, sucker, you saw I got your friend India to stop buying your oil.

Hmm, just a moment.

Narendra, Donald says you said he would stop buying oil.

Oh, really?

Just a moment.

Putin said you said I said I would stop buying oil, but I did not really say it in this way.

Oh, really?

Just a second.

Modi says you said I said he said something that he now says he didn't say.

Ugh, just a moment.

Xi, Trump said Modi said something, but Modi now says he didn't say what Trump said he said.

But if he said it, I'm not sure what to say.

Well, I'm always with you, no matter what they say.

Great.

So Xi says what he usually says when I said you said Modi said he said something he says he didn't say.

Well, you tell Xi that whatever he said you said he said about what I said Modi said.

He has no say in what I say, and what I'm saying is, you must stop the war in Ukraine.

[scoffs] Sorry, I didn't hear what you were saying.

Can you say it again?

Ah, this is too complicated.

Maybe I'll just attack Iran.

What did you say?

That's our show this week.

Come back next week if you like what you've seen or even if you can at least help Europeans, you know, just chill out a little.

Why don't you check us out at GZEROmedia.com.

[music] Funding for GZERO World is provided by our lead sponsor, Prologis.

Every day, all over the world, Prologis helps businesses of all sizes lower their carbon footprint and scale their supply chains.

With a portfolio of logistics and real estate and an end-to-end solutions platform addressing the critical initiatives of global logistics today.

Learn more at Prologis.com.

And by Cox Enterprises is proud to support GZERO.

Cox is investing in the future, working to create an impact in advanced recycling and in emerging technology companies that will help shape tomorrow.

Cox, a family of businesses.

Additional funding provided by Carnegie Corporation of New York, Koo and Patricia Yuen, committed to bridging cultural differences in our communities.

And... [music]