>> The 20th anniversary of 9/11 and the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan... this week on "Firing Line."

>> The leadership failures are legion within this administration.

>> A freshman Republican representing Michigan's 3rd District, Congressman Peter Meijer is an army veteran who served in Iraq then spent two years on the ground in Afghanistan as a civilian supporting aid workers.

As the U.S. evacuation descended into chaos... >> I stand squarely behind my decision.

>> ...Meijer boarded a flight into Kabul to assess the operation for himself.

>> What we did see was a very vulnerable security situation.

>> We were not aware when they were en route.

This is not the time to travel to Afghanistan.

>> As America remembers the September 11th attacks on this 20th anniversary... and with questions about the future of Afghanistan and security at home, what does Congressman Peter Meijer say now?

>> "Firing Line with Margaret Hoover" is made possible in part by... ...and by... Corporate funding is provided by... >> Representative Peter Meijer, welcome to "Firing Line" and thank you for your service.

>> Thank you for having me on.

>> So, as America marks the 20th anniversary of September 11th, how do you reflect now on the terror attacks our country suffered two decades ago?

>> I think it's a moment that both feels still very recent in time and, partially, how seared it is into many of our memories and how formative a moment it was, especially somebody who was growing up -- And 9/11 occurred while I was in middle school.

I think it very much shaped how we are in the world in this kind of post-Cold War moment and also led to a lot of excesses.

It led to a lot of mistakes.

It's hard to look back at the unity that we felt on September 12th, at the hope for our ability to shape the world, and then now, two decades later, see so much of that just crumbled to dust, whether it was our intervention in Afghanistan, whether it was our freighted involvement in Iraq.

And, again, feeling two decades ago like we were at our most united point, and now, you know, struggling to find a comparable series of divisions and tensions since maybe the '60s or '70s.

>> You served in an army intelligence battalion in Iraq, and after that, as a civilian, you worked in a non-governmental organization helping relief workers in Afghanistan.

What called you to service?

>> It was something I was certainly interested in before 9/11, but I think September 11th put a very fine point on just the opportunities to engage and the threats that we faced around the world.

No longer could we look at something occurring half a world away and think it was isolated, that it wouldn't come back in some way, shape, or form.

And I think the feeling that I felt -- and I know many others in my generation felt this way -- is that if somebody was going to be on that line, that we kind of had to join them, that we couldn't be bystanders.

We couldn't just sit back and assume somebody else would carry that water.

>> After 9/11, you supported America's war efforts, and you tell a story about how you even carried a pro-war poster around your high school in a backpack, just in case you stumbled across some anti-war protesters.

Now, after serving in Iraq and working in Afghanistan as a civilian, you say that the defining characteristic of America's post-9/11 conflicts is "futility."

Walk me through how your view evolved.

>> Now -- Ooh.

I was very much a hawk when I was in high school.

I founded our Teenage Republicans Club.

Looking back, I mean, it was part of that belief that the U.S. could shape, in a positive impact through military force, the rest of the world, that all we really needed to do was put some forces in the area and they could topple whatever dictator or terrorist group or malevolent force was there, and then we could just leave and it'd be happily ever after.

The reality is that, in Afghanistan, the Taliban was emboldened by the longer-term U.S. presence.

In Iraq, you know, we uncorked a very messy sectarian situation that Saddam Hussein had kept repressed, leading to both Shia militia and death squads supported by Iran and the rise of Al Qaeda in Iraq and then the Islamic State of Iraq and then the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS.

So, in all of these ways, it's hard to look at the world as it is today and argue that, over the past two decades, we have promoted more safety than risk that's been created, that we have achieved more than we have lost.

>> So, what changed in your thinking?

Was it your experience with Iraqis and Afghans that informed your change of heart?

>> Oh, it was just realizing that everything we touched kind of turned to ash, that partially you cannot -- >> Because we touch it or the way we did it?

>> Well, I mean, I would love for us to have been engaged in, you know -- Instead of leading with the DOD and then leaving State to clean up the mess, instead of having an intelligence community that was more focused on who can we kill next than how do we inform policymakers so that they can make the best decisions and judgments.

You know, everything was prioritized around this -- this martial response and around this, you know -- frankly, what I think grew out of a sense of "we need vengeance."

And I think -- Again, on a psychological level, Afghanistan was wholly unsatisfying from a feeling that we have avenged the horrors and the tragedy of September 11th.

And, again, you know, having been a believer in the ability of the U.S., through force, to effect a positive outcome and then to see time and time and time again that not come to fruition, you know -- Maybe those were all a series of independent mistakes or maybe that's just not something that we can expect to achieve.

>> So what's the alternative?

What would have been the alternative in the wake of 9/11?

>> And that's where the challenge lies.

You know, obviously, Iraq was a war that should not have been fought.

We created a lot more damage and destruction than we prevented.

And this is also the problem with having a degree of strategic impatience all around the world.

The way that the U.S. engages is we do not have an overarching objective we seek to meet.

We have a bunch of ideas and a bunch of opportunities, and we try to match the two together... but fundamentally look at the world as a series of problems to solve rather than long-term challenges to manage.

So we'll focus on one area, get bored, leave, get distracted by something else.

Meanwhile, while we're distracted elsewhere, that problem continues to metastasize.

To me, that's one of the reasons why -- The fact that we didn't have enduring diplomatic or other intelligence engagement meant that we missed or didn't respond to the rise of ISIS in that region.

We didn't address some of those tensions that were exacerbated.

>> So, then, Congressman, how do you respond to the argument that General Petraeus, for example, emphatically made to this audience a few weeks ago that ultimately the cost of staying in Afghanistan had become sustainable over the last several years in the sense that the loss of American lives had diminished to sustainable levels, American troops weren't involved in active fighting, and that we were benefiting from the success of a relatively stable Afghanistan?

How do you think about that?

>> Yeah.

No.

I think it's -- If our only metric is the loss of American lives, then, in one way, it was sustainable.

If we care at all about Afghan civilians who are dying at an extraordinary rate because of our risk aversion of American lives -- We shifted everything to an air campaign.

So this -- Yes, we didn't have Americans dying at the rate that we had grown accustomed to.

Afghan national security forces were getting slaughtered.

Afghan civilians were getting slaughter.

We were losing those battles.

Because we can say, "Oh, we're so sorry that we accidentally killed your mother, sister, husband, father, brother.

We're sorry that happened.

Here's a $2,000 solatia payment to try to make that right."

That's not going to convince somebody that America's intervention is in their best long-term interest.

You know, some of those folks are, you know -- Would they have preferred that the U.S. was victorious and that there was a better status quo?

Sure.

But to them, the fall of Kabul meant the end of a war that had taken a punishing cost and a punishing toll.

So I frankly find the idea that there was a -- we had some type of sustainable outcome or sustainable status quo laughable and frankly offensive to the folks who were dying in droves.

>> Congressman, tell me how your experience serving in Afghanistan and in Iraq informed your decision as a member of Congress to make that trip back to Afghanistan to observe the American evacuation of Kabul with Democratic Congressman and fellow war veteran Seth Moulton.

>> Yeah, there's no replacement for what you see on the ground.

I mean, that was something that I was highly critical of the State Department while I was in Afghanistan in 2013 to 2015.

They never left the embassy.

To me, there is -- there's no alternative to being in a community, to seeing how folks are reacting, what the feel is like, what the emotional register is.

>> So, what did you see?

What did you see on the ground?

Because, I mean, in the reporting about your trip, you indicate that, actually, your mind was changed when you got to that airport in Kabul about the August 31st withdrawal deadline.

What did you see there that changed your opinion?

>> You know, I will say we saw a security situation that was so much more vulnerable, untenable than I would have expected U.S. forces would ever be in.

I mean, maybe with the exception of some remote valleys in Kunar, I can't think of a time that U.S. military troops have been so exposed, have had such a disadvantageous position, and were just so vulnerable.

I mean, we were completely dependent on the benevolence of the Taliban for our evacuation efforts.

They could have launched a single mortar round and disabled that runway, and we'd be dealing with a combination of caisson and Tehran.

I mean, this -- We were just -- We had no leverage.

We had no negotiating position.

Looking at how those gates were managed at the airport, specifically Abbey Gate, which is where the suicide bomber struck a few days later, tragically killing 11 Marines, a soldier, and a Navy corpsman.

Just the impossibility of securing that... and just how close in proximity U.S. forces and the Taliban were.

In some of the other conversations we had with the generals on the ground that, again, actually gave us information that was not the deception, not the misinformation that we were hearing -- or just inaccuracies we were hearing from the State Department, from the Department of Defense, from the National Security Adviser, from President Biden himself.

But just that whole fact that we were sitting there getting fed breadcrumbs, you know, when there was no real confidence that anybody had their hand on the rudder, that there was any direction from DOD, from State that they -- And this was confirmed when we were on the ground.

This was all folks trying to do their best to manage chaos.

>> You did receive criticism.

I know you're aware of it.

You still stand by your decision to go.

>> I do.

I would say the only thing that took me by surprise is I did not realize how white-hot with rage the White House and the State Department would be at having been frankly embarrassed.

They didn't know we were there.

I mean, it kind of shines a light on just how chaotic and disorganized from a leadership level this whole process has been.

If you're talking to folks or you have friends who are on the ground who are, you know, saying, "I'm staying here tonight because the Taliban showed up at my house yesterday," that feeling of impotence, that feeling that not only have we betrayed these individuals who put faith in us, but we are actively looking the other way while they get hunted down, that's not something that I can sleep at night having tried to wash my hands of, but the White House wanted to do that.

The sort of Democratic machine lockstep wanted to put this past because they think that optics control reality.

And that's not the case.

>> You referenced the suicide bomber at the Abbey Gate that detonated just after you left, a few days after you left.

Is it your view that American men and women who made the ultimate sacrifice that day were ordered into a situation with unnecessary risk factors?

>> I would say certainly unnecessary risk factors in terms of the Kabul airport on the whole.

I will say -- And this is why I think that their service is some of the most selfless of any folks we've seen in the post-9/11 era.

Specifically that, you know, there have been known risks and there were just inevitable vulnerabilities.

The easy, risk-averse thing to do would have been just to lock the gate and say sorry for those who can't get past.

But they made the conscious decision to keep that gate open as long as possible to get as many people through as possible.

So, I mean, I think there are plenty of lives that have been lost in Iraq and Afghanistan where you can say, you know, what did they die for?

In the case of the 13 who died at Abbey Gate, you know, they died so that others may live, so that that gate could be kept open so that people could get to safety.

So I, you know -- There's a lot of things I'm gonna be very critical about.

I'll be very critical about the fact that folks were put in that position to begin with at Kabul Airport.

But how our forces on the ground managed that, I hold a tremendous amount of respect and admiration.

It was some of the most impressive, you know, local leadership and then just American resiliency I've ever seen.

>> President Biden did commit to getting interpreters out of Afghanistan who served side-by-side with our troops.

You are part of a bipartisan group of House members who introduced legislation in June to help protect Afghan allies.

Is the process broken?

>> I don't think there was a process.

It took until the end of July for these first flights to start, and it was a trickle when we needed a torrent.

>> Yeah.

>> So I'm -- Yeah, to say I'm cynical and angry and frustrated is quite an understatement on this issue.

You know, the President made a commitment to get those folks out.

He also committed he wouldn't leave until we got all Americans who wanted to leave out of Afghanistan.

That did not happen by August 31st.

That was a commitment he made.

Now, I don't know if he intended to make it or if he was off-script, but it was certainly not something he followed through on.

You know, we can't change history, but we can change how we react in this present and make sure we do right by those who stood alongside us.

>> Earlier this week, the Taliban claimed control of the Panjshir Province, the final Resistance holdout.

President Biden has said that recognizing the Taliban government is a "long way off."

But haven't we already recognized them in a certain way, both in the deal that the Trump administration made in Doha and also in the shared security during the evacuation from Kabul?

>> There were plenty of dark jokes, and it was an absurd scenario, an upside-down scenario not lost on anybody at Kabul Airport, you know, that the Taliban were functionally our host-nation security partners.

We were having regular meetings, deconflicting, coordinating activities.

Recognition of the Taliban is frankly the last piece of leverage that the U.S. has.

I mean, the degree to which they care or seek out legitimacy or standing on the world stage.

And that's very much an open question.

It's clear that the Taliban are not the, you know, hipster reform, you know, forward-looking element.

Four of the five individuals who were released from Guantanamo Bay are now in the upper echelons of the Taliban's leadership.

Released from Guantanamo Bay in exchange for Bowe Bergdahl.

You know, so this is -- There's a lot of retreads.

There's a lot of kind of institutional powerbrokers.

There's a lot of folks with a lot of blood on their hands.

Now, the Afghan government have a lot of folks with blood on their hands, too.

So, you know, this is a very messy situation, no matter which way it's going to unfold, but it is a bit absurd to have an interior minister who has either a $5 or $10 million bounty on his head still from the Department of Justice.

>> You've said that President Biden and his administration have lied repeatedly to the American people and to Congress over the course of the withdrawal.

You know, there are hardliners in the Republican Party who said that Biden should resign or face impeachment.

Listen, you are somebody I know who takes impeachment very seriously, as you were one of the 10 Republicans who actually voted for President Trump's second impeachment after the riots at the Capitol on January 6th.

Is President Biden's botched evacuation from Afghanistan grounds for impeachment proceedings, in your view?

>> I think it very well could be.

You know, I think there is -- Well, I guess the question's raised -- is incompetence impeachment?

I, you know, obviously set down a marker where I view impeachment when it came to President Trump's conduct around January 6th.

To me, that was an abdication of the oath of office, both in the immediate response to it, when the numbers two, three, and four in that presidential line of succession were at the Capitol, and not a finger was lifted to ensure or provide for their security... and also in the flirtation with political violence and trying to extract by force what you couldn't extract at the ballot box.

When it comes to President Biden's behavior on this, I mean, "A," there's the prudential question of -- Biden's impeached.

What next?

You know, I think, again, we have an overarching crisis of competence within our government.

I'm not sure that that would be solved -- that issue would be solved through impeachment right now.

But I can tell you I will -- If articles are introduced, I will treat them the same way as I've treated prior articles so far in my long and tenured history, having been in Congress for just over eight months.

>> Well, let me -- let me show you something.

In 1979 in the original version of this program, "Firing Line," that was hosted by William F. Buckley Jr., Buckley welcomed General William Westmoreland to the program.

He was, of course, the former commander of U.S. troops in Vietnam.

Listen to how he reflected on Vietnam.

>> Is there a sense in which you have let down the American people by any failure to dramatize the high risk of ignoring military advice?

>> Well, I think you're quite right.

There are perceptions, as you have described them.

The Vietnam War was a sour experience for the American public.

And you do allude to the fact that maybe the military should have been a little bit more vocal and should have been more forthcoming with their advice.

And I think there -- I think there's merit to that argument.

>> As a veteran and a member of Congress who visited Kabul in the final hours, do you think the military should have been more vocal with President Biden about the risks of withdrawing in such a short time frame?

>> I am a little bit surprised that we haven't seen the resignations that I think we should have seen, that members of the military -- And this is always a very -- It's a delicate subject in civil military engagement.

At what point do you push forward and say, you know, "I'm going to, you know --" We have civilian control.

You can't have somebody pushing forward and trying to overrule, you know, that civilian decision.

At the same time, you as a member of the military, as a senior leadership, are, by sticking in that role, by sticking with that position, validating -- Even if you don't agree with the course of action, you're validating the leadership that chose that course of action by continuing to serve.

I think this is one of the reasons why -- And we saw with Secretary Defense Mattis when he disagreed with President Trump's decision on Syria, he resigned.

I think that's what we should have seen in this Afghanistan withdrawal.

And, again, you can make the argument that after the fall of Kabul, well, I don't want to cause more instability.

Fine.

Sure.

So where are the resignations now?

>> But are you saying that it's the Defense Department's fault and it's the military's fault?

Or do you lay the blame also at the feet of the State Department or the NSC or the White House?

>> 100%, all of the above.

I mean, this -- What we saw does not take place because there was one breakdown in one place.

I think the ultimate accountability obviously lies with the President, who appointed and directed and established the priorities of these individuals.

And within the State Department, it obviously lies with the Secretary of State.

Within the Defense Department, with the Secretary of Defense.

Within the NSC, with the National Security Adviser.

You know, all of these entities and all of these bodies were integral to this failure.

Right now, 20 years after 9/11, every conceivable terrorist organization, maybe with the exception of Al Qaeda -- Every conceivable terrorist organization is leaps and bounds more influential than they were two decades ago and where we have several groups that have sprung up that didn't exist, that have come to enormous -- come to be able to control territory in large swaths, at least temporarily.

This was something we never saw in the pre-9/11 environment.

>> Help me just understand, then, who should resign.

>> [ Chuckles ] I -- >> Is it political leadership?

>> I think there should be political resignations.

I'm surprised that there -- And, again, there's a difference between resigning because you disagree with the course of action.

That window has passed, right?

The Mattis-like resignation, that window passed.

Right now it's resigning because you realize that -- the lack of fitness to perform the job that you're currently doing.

And I -- >> The National Security Adviser?

>> I have said and will -- If all four principals -- If the Secretary of State, if the National Security Adviser, if the Secretary of Defense, if the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- If all four of them are still in their roles six months from now, shame on us.

I mean, that -- that just reflects such a desire to move past -- you know, to view the fall of Kabul as a speed bump to get by rather than as a pivotal moment in our foreign-policy engagement and in the failures of our national-security establishment to reckon with.

>> Do you have concerns?

Because there are some security experts, Congressman, who say that it's really, truly under those conditions, only a matter of time before extremist groups reconstitute themselves in Afghanistan, regenerate, and again threaten U.S. security and our interests.

How likely does that seem to you?

>> I certainly think it's possible.

I think it's also important to note that not everything is about us, that there are plenty of others with more regional ambitions.

There's a lot of different ways this can shake out, not necessarily just Al Qaeda feeling they have enough space that's reconstituted.

Because they never really lost that space in the Pakistani tribal areas.

So if it's just looking for a void, for a vacuum to be able to reconstitute, there are other opportunities out there.

You know, the Taliban know that we could drop a lot of bombs very quickly.

I mean, the U.S. is very capable of killing people.

We're not really great at figuring out how to get them to safely be in a position to be governed.

But we could still wreak damage.

But there is a very fair question of what the U.S. appetite is.

>> America marks the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks this weekend.

How will you be spending this weekend?

>> I think, you know, talking -- Well, checking in with friends.

I think that's -- Especially since the fall of Kabul.

You know, coming after this just embarrassing, shameful, depressing, dispiriting collapse in Afghanistan.

And not just that, but the moral injury or the slap in the face on top of that moral injury of leaving folks behind.

There were ways in the aftermath of 9/11 to feel like, you know that tremendous loss and that tremendous suffering could bring about a more positive outcome, that the U.S. was woken up to a risk in the world that we would then move to address or shape or prevent from occurring again.

And it's hard to feel two decades on like anything positive has resulted today.

>> Congressman Peter Meijer, thank you for your service and thank you for your time here today on this 20th anniversary of 9/11.

>> Thank you.

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